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Abstract
The growth in the interest rates paid on Spanish public debt since 2008 and the impairment 
of the interbank market have generated concerns about their effects on competition for 
bank deposits in Spain. I combine a nested logit model of bank deposit supply with a 
structural model of competition to measure the impact of the reference interest rates on 
public debt and interbank markets on the returns on deposits and funding policy of Spanish 
banks in the period 2003-2010. The interbank rate is found to be more closely correlated 
with the return on deposits than the interest rate on public debt, but the connection between 
interbank rates and deposit returns is signifi cantly weaker in the crisis period 2008-2010. 
Counterfactual analysis shows a signifi cant effect of the interbank rate and investment 
opportunities in public debt on deposit rates and bank profi ts, and that observed deposit 
rates are on average 115bp above collusive levels.
Keywords: Bank Competition, Interbank Rates, Public Debt, Nested Logit, Counterfactual 
Analysis.
JEL classifi cation: G21, D43, L1.
Resumen
El crecimiento de los tipos de interés pagados por la deuda pública española desde 2008 
y la disrupción del mercado interbancario han generado preocupación por sus efectos 
sobre la competencia del mercado de depósitos bancarios en España. Combino un modelo 
logit anidado de la oferta de depósitos con un modelo estructural de competencia para 
medir el impacto de los tipos de interés de referencia de la deuda pública y los mercados 
interbancarios en el retorno a los depósitos bancarios y la política de fi nanciación de 
los bancos españoles durante 2003-2010. Se encuentra que el tipo interbancario está 
más correlacionado con el retorno en los depósitos que el tipo de interés de la deuda 
pública, pero la conexión entre tipos interbancarios y retorno a los depósitos bancarios es 
signifi cativamente más débil en el período de crisis de 2008-2010. El análisis contrafactual 
revela un efecto importante del tipo interbancario y de las oportunidades de inversión 
en deuda pública en los tipos de depósito y los benefi cios bancarios, y que los tipos de 
depósitos observados están de media 115 pb por encima de los niveles colusivos.
Palabras clave: Competencia Bancaria; Tipos Interbancarios; Deuda Pública; Logit Anidado; 
Análisis Contrafactual.
Códigos JEL: G21, D43, L1.
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1. Introduction 
 Empirical research has shown in the past that the interbank rate worked as a 
reference for the interest rates of loan and deposit products offered by Spanish banks. In 
particular, the remuneration of bank deposits has been historically set equal to the 
interbank rate minus a margin discount. However, the interest cost of term deposits has 
been generally above the interbank rate since 2008. This observation is surprising if we 
use as framework of analysis a standard model of banking competition, where banks 
have some degree of market power in the loan and deposit markets and have access to 
an interbank market with a perfectly elastic supply of funds.1 In such a framework, it is 
not possible to observe a market equilibrium with an interest rate on bank deposits 
above the interbank rate, as banks would then have the incentive and the ability to 
substitute deposits for interbank funding. The addition to the standard model of 
disruptions in the interbank market and bank investments in public debt can help to 
solve this puzzle and explain the observed deposit rates in recent history. In this article, 
I estimate a structural model of the Spanish bank deposit market to examine its relation 
with interbank and public debt markets and the intensity of competition.  
 The operation of the European interbank market has been disrupted following 
the financial crisis of 2008. The reduced volumes of transactions, raising spreads and 
the recourse to European Central Bank, ECB henceforth, liquidity operations have 
signaled the difficulties of borrowers to access the interbank market, ECB (2008, 2010). 
For the particular case of Spain, the negative difference of the interbank rate and deposit 
rates since 2008 implied also that it would be unprofitable for Spanish banks to use 
deposit funding to participate as lenders in the interbank market. Even with limited 
                                                     
1 In particular, Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) models of multiproduct monopoly in which the bank 
determines the amounts of loans and deposits. These models can be generalized to a Cournot oligopoly 
model and to models of monopoly and oligopoly with price as strategic variable. See Freixas and Rochet 
(2002). 
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participation of Spanish banks in the interbank market, a significant fraction of Spanish 
loans are still referenced to the Euribor interbank rate.2 The referencing of loans to 
interbank rates implies that this market can still impact the expected return on bank 
loans after 2008, and therefore the incentives of Spanish banks to set deposit rates and 
obtain funds to finance these loans. The relation between the interbank rate and bank 
deposits is nonetheless expected to change depending on whether normal access to the 
interbank market is available, or interbank rates impact the banks only through the 
referencing of loan rates. 
 The funds obtained from bank deposits can also be invested in public debt. The 
growth in the rates paid on Spanish public debt since 2008 increases the interest margin 
of these securities relative to the interest cost of bank deposits. Public debt assets bring 
an additional option value originating from its possible future use to obtain liquidity in 
the repo market or with the ECB.3 Spanish public debt was an investment option for 
Spanish banks before the financial crisis, and this already created a connection between 
the markets for public debt and bank deposits. However, the high interest rates on 
public debt and its heightened importance as a liquidity instrument after 2008 plausibly 
altered its relation with the bank deposit market. 
 This article uses regulatory data at the individual bank level on the deposit 
volume and interest rates of bank deposits in Spain during the period 2003-2010 to 
estimate the deposit supply function. The estimates of the deposit supply model are 
combined with a structural Nash pricing model of competition in the deposit market to 
infer the expected returns on deposit funds. These implied returns on deposits are 
calculated from the profit-maximization conditions of the formal competition model 
                                                     
2 For example, Bank of Spain interest rate reports (model I.2 described in BOE (2010)) show that 
approximately 90% of mortgages for home acquisitions are granted with a revision period of less than a 
year. The mortgage rate is commonly referred to the Euribor interbank rate in contract revisions. 
3 The ECB documents the continued use of its liquidity transactions by European banks since 2008. See 
Section 3 of the ECB Financial Stability Review in ECB (2008, 2010). The ECB provides an overview of 
its open market operations at http://www.ecb.int/mopo/implement/intro/html/index.en.html. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 9 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1319
evaluated at the observed deposit rates. I then study the statistical relation of implied 
returns with the interest rates on the interbank and public debt markets. Counterfactual 
exercises are used to compute the sensitivity of deposit rates and bank profits to the 
interbank rate, interest rates on public debt and the intensity of competition. 
 I use a nested logit specification for the supply of bank deposits, which allows 
me to control for the possible endogeneity of deposit rates, through instrumental 
variables estimation, and recover different substitution patterns across commercial and 
savings banks. The existing empirical industrial organization literature, as reviewed 
below, has shown the importance of this class of discrete choice methods to accurately 
estimate price elasticities, which are a key input to the counterfactual exercises and the 
recovery of implicit returns. I find an elasticity of individual bank deposit supply with 
respect to its own deposit rate of 0.93 and that the correction for endogeneity bias is 
relevant. The analysis of the relation of deposit returns and reference interest rates 
reveals that the Euribor 12 months is clearly correlated with the implied return on 
deposits through the sample, though this relation is weaker after 2008. The interest rates 
on public debt are found to have a greater impact on the return on deposits after 2008. 
These findings offer some support for the concern that the exposure of Spanish banks to 
interbank and public debt markets changed during the financial crisis. 
 The counterfactual analysis in this article reveals that collusion in the deposit 
market can increase bank profits, but the variations of the reference rates in the 
interbank and public debt markets are found to have a larger impact on bank profits than 
the relaxation of competition.4 These results point to reference interest rates with impact 
on bank deposit returns as more relevant indicators of financial stability than measures 
of concentration in the Spanish bank deposit market.  
                                                     
4 The concern over the impact of competitive tensions on the level of deposit rates lead to the Bank of 
Spain to introduce penalty contributions to the Deposit Guarantee Fund as a function of the level of 
deposit rates offered. See BOE (2011). 
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 The banking literature has long been concerned with the effects of competition 
on deposit rates. Berger and Hannan (1989) estimate the impact of concentration on 
deposit rates in the U.S. within a structure conduct performance framework, Hannan 
and Berger (1991) study the impact of market concentration and bank characteristics on 
bank level deposit rate decisions and Amel and Hannan (1999) estimate the deposit rate 
elasticity of bank deposits to measure the possibilities of substitution to nonbank 
financial institutions. Hannan and Berger (1991) consider the impact of changes in the 
average return of the securities market on deposit rates, but their objectives and data are 
not oriented to study the impact of the reference rates of different markets on deposit 
rates. 
 The developments in the empirical industrial organization literature, in 
particular, the extension of the use of discrete choice models and structural assumptions 
following Berry, Levihnson and Pakes (1995), BLP henceforth, provide new tools to 
examine the behavior and welfare of depositors and they have been applied to the study 
of the U.S. bank deposit markets in a series of recent articles. Adams et al. (2007) fit a 
generalized extreme value model to the market share data of deposit institutions in the 
U.S. to estimate the cross elasticities between the interest rates offered by commercial 
banks and thrifts. Dick (2008) uses different multinomial logit models to estimate the 
relation between the deposit supply in the U.S. and deposit rates, service fees and 
branch network density. Dick (2008) uses this deposit supply model to measure the 
consequences in welfare of the merger process initiated after the Riegel-Neal Act of 
1994. Knittel and Stango (2008) also employ a logistic model to estimate the deposit 
supply in the U.S. as a function of deposit rates and ATM network characteristics.5  
                                                     
5Additional international studies of deposit institutions include Cohen (2004), Cohen and Mazzeo (2007), 
Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), Foccarelli and Panetta (2003) and Guo (2003). 
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 Ishii (2008) estimates the supply of deposits in the U.S. with a mixed logit 
model with the purpose of evaluating the impact on consumer welfare of ATM fees 
charged to consumers belonging to different networks and obtaining an estimate of the 
investment costs of expansion of ATM networks. Ho and Ishii (2011) improve the 
estimation technique in Ishii (2008) incorporating an outside option to bank deposits 
and detailed geographic data to obtain a more precise estimate of the welfare impact of 
the geographic expansion of banks as result of the Riegel-Neal Act. The financial crisis 
started on 2008 has increased the interest in the analysis of the relation between 
sovereign debt and the banking sector,6 and the current article contributes to this 
literature with new structural analysis of the effects of tensions in the public debt market 
and impairment of the interbank market on the competition for bank deposits.  
 The deposit and loan markets in Spain have been the object of different 
empirical studies. Carbó et al. (2005) estimate a linear demand model for loans and 
deposits and they use it to infer the strategic reaction of commercial and savings banks 
to changes in the interest rates and advertising policies of competitors. Martín-Oliver 
and Salas-Fumás (2008) estimate a production function and a logit demand model for 
loans and deposits, which allow them to identify the contribution of information 
technology to the production process, measure the impact of advertising on demand and 
verify the strategic rationality of interest rate and advertising policies. Martín-Oliver, 
Salas-Fumás and Saurina (2007) study the dispersion in the deposit and loan rates in the 
Spanish banking sector and they find evidence of imperfect long term convergence of 
interest rates to marginal costs. Martín-Oliver (2010) studies also the evolution of 
competition in the banking sector in the period 1988-2003 and he finds an increase in 
                                                     
6 Recent novel theoretical contributions include Broner at al. (2010), Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and 
Acharya and Rajan (2013). Acharya and Steffen (2013) analyze empirically the incentive of banks to 
raise short term finance and invest in public debt and Gennaioli et al. (2013) study the impact of 
sovereign default on private sector credit with a panel of countries. 
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market power in the loan sector, decrease in market power in the deposit sector and 
greater use of advertising and information technologies in the later years of the sample. 
Jiménez, López and Saurina (2007) find evidence of a negative relation between 
concentration and credit risk in the Spanish banking sector. 
 The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set. 
Section 3 introduces the empirical methodology and a simple theoretical model that 
motivates the analysis. Section 4 presents the results of deposit supply estimation and 
the analysis of the relation between the implied return on bank deposits and reference 
interest rates. Section 5 completes the counterfactual exercises and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Data and descriptive analysis 
 2.1  Data set 
 The data on interest rates and volume of new deposits of Spanish commercial 
and savings banks is obtained from the interest rate information reported monthly by 
deposit institutions to the Bank of Spain.7 This information is required by default to 
deposit institutions with an asset size of at least 1.5 billion euros and a domestic deposit 
stock of at least 500 million euros, and it can also be requested to smaller institutions, 
covering a representative part of the financial system. These data correspond to new 
operations within the month and provide deposit rates actually applied within the month 
at the individual institution level rather than average financial interest revenues. I 
calculate the average deposit rates for households and non-financial firms with a 
weighted average by volume of deposits with terms above and below the year for each 
class of depositor. The data on the Euribor 12 months –the interbank reference rate for 
Spanish deposit institutions– and the interest rates of Spanish public debt are obtained 
from the statistical bulletin of the Bank of Spain. 
                                                     
7 The interest rate data collection by the bank of Spain follows European Monetary and Economic Union 
regulations, as published in the Bank of Spain Order 1/2010 in BOE (2010). The model form I.2 for 
interest rate information used in the article can be consulted in that same order in BOE (2010).   
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 I collect institution level information on the number of employees, number of 
branches, labor costs and the commissions and fees associated to payment services 
(debit and credit cards, wire transfers, checks, etc.) from income statement data filed by 
deposit institutions to the Bank of Spain. I also make use of the data on the total stock of 
deposits of households and non-financial firms from the monthly reports of deposit 
balances collected by the Bank of Spain. I calculate the average payment services rate 
charged to customers with the ratio of payment service fees and the stocks of household 
and non financial firm deposits. I use the total stock of household deposits in the 
financial system, which includes the stock of deposits held by credit cooperatives and 
foreign branches, as a measure of the total size of the market for household deposits. As 
a complementary measure of market size, I also use data on the asset balances of 
households in the Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy published by the Bank of 
Spain. 
 2.2 Evolution of interest rates in the period 2003-2010 
 The deposits in commercial and savings banks can be classified according to the 
type of depositor (households and non financial firms, NFFs henceforth) and the term of 
the deposit (term up to and above one year). For each of these contract categories, the 
left panel of Figure 1 plots the cross sectional average of interest rates on new deposits. 
The remuneration of deposits increased significantly from January 2006 to December 
2008, with an approximate rise of 300bp, but this increase was reverted during 2009. 
The deposit rates on different contract categories are highly correlated and there are no 
significant differences between the evolution of the deposit rates across depositors and 
maturities. For example, the coefficient of correlation is 0.96 for the interest rate on 
deposits of households with a term of up to one year and the interest rate on deposits of 
households with a term above one year. The coefficient of correlation is 0.99 for the 
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interest rates on deposits of households and NFFs with a term of up to one year. Given 
the parallel evolution of different deposit rates and the focus of the literature on 
household deposits, I use the household deposit rates and volumes for the remaining of 
the article. 
 The right panel of Figure 1 shows the average deposit rate on new deposits from 
households with a term of up to one year, the Euribor 12 months and the interest rates of 
Spanish public debt for different maturities (one year, five and ten years). The deposit 
rate stays below the Euribor 12 months until November 2008 and above this reference 
rate after this date, e. g., the positive difference with respect to the Euribor 12 months 
approaches 100bp in May 2010. The interest rate of Treasury Bills with one year term 
stays below the level of the Euribor 12 months and the interest rate on new deposits 
from households with term up to one year since the end of 2007 to mid-2010. The 
Treasury Bills do not represent thus an attractive investment in this period for 
commercial and savings banks if it is financed with bank deposits. Since April 2010, the 
interest rate of Treasury Bills with one year term is higher than the Euribor 12 months 
and it even grows over the level of the average deposit rate in December 2010. 
However, it is not possible to use this specific event to conclude that Treasury Bills 
tensioned significantly the financing costs of commercial and savings banks during the 
sample period. On the contrary, funding with bank deposits the purchase of bonds of 
Spanish government debt with terms of 5 and 10 years is a profitable investment 
strategy except during the peak of deposit remuneration in 2008. For example, the 
average interest rate since January 2009 on new deposits from households with one year 
term is 2.4% whereas the average interest rates on Spanish government bonds with 5 
and 10 year maturities are respectively 3.3% and 4.3%.  
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 The deterioration of the margins of deposits with respect to the Euribor 12 
months and the one year Treasury Bills does not affect all the banks equally. Since 
2009, I observe an increase in the volatility of margins in the cross section of banks. 
The Figure 2 presents the evolution of the standard deviation of the relative margins of 
deposits of households with respect to the Euribor 12 months, the one year Treasury Bill 
and the 5 and 10 year bond. The four-fold increase in the volatility of the relative 
margin with respect to the Euribor 12 months during the period posterior to 2008 
reveals significant variation in the offered deposit rates in the cross section of banks 
during the latter sample years.8 The two panels in Figure 2 do not show significant 
differences in the volatility as function of the term of deposits. 
 3. Estimation of deposit supply and implicit reference rates 
 The data described in Section 2 reveal changes in the aggregate conditions in the 
Spanish bank deposit market over the sample period, but it is not possible to conclude 
without a more formal analysis either that relations between the different interest rate 
variables are statistically significant or that deposit rates contracted in different periods 
represent a prudent business strategy for banks. This section introduces a simple model 
of deposit supply and bank behavior to infer from the volume and interest rate of 
deposit contracts the implicit expected returns on deposit funding. Once this implicit 
return is recovered, it is possible to study its relation with the reference rates in the 
interbank and public debt markets. This procedure applies the techniques employed to 
extract implicit marginal costs, e. g., BLP (1995), to the recovery of the implicit return 
on deposit funds. 
 
                                                     
8 The volatility of the margin with respect to the interest rate on the bonds with 5 and 10 year terms is 
lower due to the higher average level of the yield on these bonds. The relative margin is defined as (rA-
rDEP)/rA, so a higher level of asset return rA reduces the impact on the standard deviation of the greater 
cross sectional variability of the deposit rate rDEP. 
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 3.1. Theoretical considerations 
 In this section, I use a simple model of bank behavior to illustrate how limited 
access to the interbank market changes the expected return on deposits and, as a 
consequence, the incentives of the bank to increase this form of financing. 
 A profit maximizing bank i sets deposit and loan rates ri(d) and ri(l) to collect 
deposit funds  Di and grant total loans Li. In addition, the bank i can take a net position Ii 
in the interbank market at an interest rate REuribor and a net position Mi in the public debt 
market through an interest rate bid ri(m).9 The demand for loans Li, public debt Mi and 
the supply of deposits Di are continuously differentiable functions of, respectively, ri(l), 
ri(m) and ri(d). Other arguments of these functions include interest rates set by rivals,    
r-i(l), r-i(m) and r-i(d), market and macroeconomic conditions, X(l), X(m) and X(d), and 
parameters, βD, βL and βM. The deposit, loan and public debt functions are then: 
Di(βD, ri(d), r-i(d), X(d)); Li(βL, ri(l), r-i(l), X(l)); Mi(βM, ri(m), r-i(m), X(m)) 
 The first derivatives of these functions with respect to own interest rates have 
signs defined by: 
∂Di(βD, ri(d),.)/∂ri(d) ≥ 0; ∂Li(βL, ri(l),.)/∂ri(l) ≤ 0; ∂Mi(βM, ri(m))/∂ri(m) ≤ 0 
 The profit maximization problem of the bank is given by: 
(1)  max ri(d), ri(l), Ii, ri(m) (ri(l)-ci(l))·Li – (ri(d)+ci(d))·Di+ ri(m)·Mi  - Ii ·REuribor 
subject to  Li  +Mi ≤ Ii + Di 
where the constraint is included to capture the need to finance new asset acquisitions 
with deposits and borrowing in the interbank market.10 The terms ci(l) and ci(d) 
represent the operating costs of granting new loans and accepting new deposits. Under 
                                                     
9 A perfectly elastic supply of public debt at rate r(m) would allow to generate infinite profits through 
arbitrage if REuribor ≠ r(m) and equilibrium market clearing would require REuribor = r(m). I introduce the 
interest rate bid ri(m) and function Mi(.) motivated by the competitive bidding in primary public debt 
markets and order clearing in organized security exchanges that provide secondary markets. This is a 
reasonable assumption to construct a simple illustrative model with both interbank and debt markets. 
10 It is straightforward to extend the analysis to include capital as a financing alternative. This extension is 
omitted for brevity, as the examination of the interbank and debt markets suffices for the purpose of 
illustrating the effect on deposit rates of limited access to a particular securities market. 
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reasonable specifications of the asset demand and deposit supply functions, the bank has 
no incentive to raise costly funds and not to invest them in assets so the constraint in (1) 
will hold with equality. The first order conditions for an interior solution are then: 
(2)    ri(l) :  (ri(l)-ci(l)-μL)·∂Li/∂ri(l)     + Li  = 0 
(3)    ri(m):  (ri(m)-μL)·∂Mi/∂ri(m)        + Mi  = 0 
(4)    ri(d):  (μL -ri(d)-ci(d))·∂Di/∂ri(d) - Di  = 0 
   Ii:  μL - REuribor     = 0 
where μL is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the funding constraint in (1). It is 
possible to substitute μL = REuribor in the first order condition (4) for deposit rate ri(d) to 
find that the marginal deposit funding cost equals the marginal cost of financing an 
increase of deposits ∂Di/∂ri(d) at the interbank rate REuribor. 
(5)    REuribor·∂Di/∂ri(d) = (ri(d) + ci(d))·∂Di/∂ri(d) + Di 
 The profit maximization problem of a bank with no access to the interbank 
market is formulated as: 
(6)   max ri(d), ri(l), ri(m) (ri(l)-ci(l))·Li – (ri(d)+ci(d))·Di+ ri(m)·Mi  
subject to  Li +Mi ≤ Di 
 The absence of a first order condition for the interbank market implies that is not 
possible to cleanly identify the Lagrangean multiplier as μL = REuribor. The identification 
of the equilibrium value of μL will require the joint solution of  the system of first order 
conditions (2), (3) and (4) together with the constraint Li+Mi = Di. The solution for μL 
will depend on the particular specification of functions Li, Di and Mi, and cost 
components ci(l) and ci(d). The equation (4) can then be rearranged to obtain: 
(7)   μL(ci, β, X,. )·∂Di/∂ri(d) = (ri(d) + ci(d))·∂Di/∂ri(d) + Di 
where X≡[X(l), X(m), X(d)], ci≡[ci(l), ci(d)] and β≡[βD, βL, βM] collect exogenous 
variables, cost terms and parameters. It is important to note that the interbank rate 
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REuribor will not enter equation (7) unless it forms part of the exogenous variables X. For 
example, Spanish mortgages are commonly indexed to the Euribor 12 months so it 
would be reasonable to assume when studying Spanish banks that REuribor ? X(l). Even if 
REuribor belongs to X, the relation between the interbank rate and the marginal cost of 
deposits will differ from the unrestricted case in equation (5) as X will typically enter 
the solution for μL(.) nonlinearly. For example, consider the program in (6) for a simple 
specification with ci(l)=ci(d)=0 and Li =a - ri(l), Mi =b- ri(m) and Di =c+ ri(d) where a 
=a1 +a2·REuribor + a3·(REuribor)2 and b and c are constants. The solution of this program 
yields an equilibrium value of the Lagrange multiplier μL=(a+b-c)/3. If bank i instead 
had unrestricted access to the interbank market, μL= REuribor. 
 A general form of the optimal deposit rate rules in (5) and (7) is given by: 
(8)    Ri·∂Di/∂ri(d) = ri(d)·∂Di/∂ri(d) + Di 
where the right hand side of (8) is the marginal interest rate cost of deposits and Ri is the 
expected equilibrium return on an increase in deposit funding of ∂Di/∂ri(d). For the 
model above with access to the interbank market, the equilibrium return Ri would be 
defined by Ri = REuribor - ci(d). For the model with restricted access to the interbank 
market, the equilibrium return is Ri = μL(ci, β, X,.)-ci(d), where the Lagrange multiplier 
μL(.) will typically be a nonlinear function of exogenous variables and parameters.  
 The stylized models above are used to illustrate how the equilibrium cost of 
deposits depends on the participation in the interbank and public debt markets. 
However, I do not have ex ante knowledge of whether the models in (1) and (6) are a 
good description of the behavior of Spanish banks in the period 2008-2010 and I do not 
apply these models to the data. I rather use the condition in (8), which applies under the 
mild assumption of bank profit maximization, to infer indirectly Ri from the marginal 
interest rate cost of deposits in the right hand side of (8). The return Ri can then be 
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projected on REuribor and the interest rates of public debt to test empirically whether the 
reference rate of a particular asset market, e. g., the interbank market, is correlated with 
the return Ri implied by the marginal deposit cost in equation (8). I detail this procedure 
in the next subsection. 
 3.2. Empirical implementation 
 The expected return on the deposit funds of bank i in the period t, Rit, will 
depend on the exposure to different asset classes (private loan portfolio, public debt, 
interbank loans, etc.) resulting from the investment strategy of the bank i and market 
access restrictions, the returns on each of these asset classes and its cost structure. 
Grouping the individual fixed effect of each deposit institution in αi,o and the variable 
effect of institution specific factors in εit, it is possible to formulate a model of the 
implicit expected return Rit: 
(9) Rit = αi,o + αt,Euribor·Rt,Euribor+ αt,Bill·Rt,Bill+αt,Bond5·Rt, Bond5+ αt,Bond10·Rt, Bond10 +εit 
where {αt,Euribor,αt,Bill,αt,Bond5,αt,Bond10} and {Rt,Euribor,Rt,Bill,Rt,Bond5,Rt,Bond10} respectively 
denote the bank loadings and interest rate levels for the Euribor 12 months, the one year 
Treasury Bill, and the five and ten year Spanish government bonds. Equation (9) can be 
interpreted as a first order linear approximation to the equilibrium return Rit in the 
equation (8) for the condition on the marginal deposit costs of a profit maximizing bank. 
  The implicit return Rit is not directly observable, but it can be recovered through 
the fact that the interest rate rit of the deposits of a bank with an optimal investment 
strategy yielding Rit will satisfy the optimal deposit rate rule in (8) to maximize the 
profits from deposit funds. In order to complete this task, it is necessary to specify a 
deposit supply function. I define Dit(β, rit, xit, ξit, r-it, x-it, ξ-it) as the supply of deposits to 
bank i in period t, which is a continuously differentiable  function of the parameters β, 
the deposit rate offered by the bank i, rit, exogenous bank characteristics xit (number of 
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branches, brand value, etc.) and an unobserved supply factor ξit, in addition to the 
interest rates, characteristics and unobserved supply factors associated to competitors  
(r-it, x-it, ξ-it). The first order condition (8) can be used to express Rit as a function of the 
rest of variables of the problem: 
(10)   Rit = rit + ( Dit(rit, r-it, β, xit, ξit,.)/[∂Dit(rit, r-it, β, xit, ξit, .)/∂rit] ) 
where I have omitted some arguments of the supply function for brevity. The estimates 
of Rit obtained from (10) can be used as dependent variable in the model of expected 
returns considered in (9). I estimate a nested logit specification of deposit supply with 
the purpose of applying equation (10) to the data. For this specification, the utility of a 
depositor j that places her savings in bank i in period t is defined by: 
uijt = δit + ζjtg + (1-σ)·εijt 
where δit represents the mean utility of holding deposits at bank i. This mean utility is a 
function of both observed characteristics and the unobserved supply factor ξit: 
(11)          δit= xit·β+ βr·rit+ ξit 
 The terms ζjtg and εijt are two independent random variables with the extreme 
Type-I distribution and σ ?? [0, 1). The variable ζjtg represents a common shock to the 
utility for depositor j of deposits in all the banks belonging to a group g, whereas the 
individual shock εijt represents the idiosyncratic utility of holding deposits at bank i for 
depositor j. The deposit supply function implied by this distributional assumption is:11 
(12)   Dit(rit, r-it, β, xit, ξit,.) = Mt ·[e δit /(1-σ)·(Σsєg e δst/(1-σ) )- σ]/[ Σg=1,…,G (Σsєg e δst/(1-σ) )(1- σ)] 
where s indexes the banks belonging to a group g and Mt represents the total available 
funds that can be supplied as deposits in period t. The effective supply of bank i in (12) 
is decomposed into the product of market size Mt and the probability that a 
representative depositor chooses bank i given by the exponential term in (12). If σ=0, 
                                                     
11 A full exposition of the nested logit and other generalized extreme value discrete choice models can be 
found in Mc Fadden (1978), Berry (1994) and Train (2009). 
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the change in the interest rate of a bank i has the same effect on the market shares of all 
other banks irrespective of the group to which they belong (basic logit model). For σ>0, 
depositors that choose a bank i in a group g are more likely to switch to banks inside the 
same group in response to interest rate changes. In the estimation results below, I define 
two different groups for commercial and savings banks to allow for the possibility that 
depositors are more likely to substitute across the same type of institutions. 
 The expression in (12) is not linear in the parameters, but it can be shown to 
imply, as in Berry(1994), the following linear equation: 
(13)    ln(sit) - ln(s0t) = xit·β + βr·rit + σ·ln(sit|g) + ξit  
where sit represents the market share of bank i in period t, s0t is the market share of the 
outside option (the best savings alternative to bank deposits) and sit|g is the market share 
of bank i inside the group of institutions g in period t. 
 It can be shown that the deposit supply formula in (12) implies that the own 
deposit rate elasticity is given by:  
(14)     εi(rit)  =   βr·rit·(- sit+1/(1-σ)- (σ /(1-σ))·sit|g) 
 The cross elasticities of the share of bank i with respect to the deposit rate rst of a 
bank s in the same nest and in a different nest are given by:  
(15)   εi(rst, s ??g and i ??g) = - βr·rst·(sst + (σ /(1-σ))·sst|g) 
(16)   εi(rit, s??g and i ??g)  = -βr·rst·sst 
where the formula in (15) is the standard logit cross elasticity and the formulas in (14) 
and (16) differ from the standard logit benchmark as long as σ≠0, reflecting the different 
substitution patterns of different banks across groups. 
 For a bank i in a given month t, I define the share sit as the ratio of the volume of 
new household deposits in bank i over the total stock of deposits from households in the 
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financial system.12 I use the average weighted by volume of the interest rate on new 
deposits from households with maturities above and below a year as deposit rate rit in 
equations (10) and (13). All specifications include as exogenous variables the number of 
branches, the employees per office, service fees and fixed effects for the trimester and 
the identity of each bank. Table 1 provides summary statistics of all the variables 
relevant for estimation. 
 It is possible to estimate the parameters in (13) through ordinary least squares, 
OLS henceforth. The OLS method entails the risk of generating inconsistent estimates 
of β through the possible correlation between the deposit rate rit and the unobserved 
supply shock ξit. The use of instruments and the two stage least squares method, 2SLS 
henceforth, avoids this problem and derives consistent estimates of the parameters in β. 
I use as instruments the sixth lags of the deposit rates, service fee rates, the ten year 
bond rate and the labor cost per worker. The organization and cost structure of a bank is 
stable over six month periods, and the lagged variables with respect to time t provide 
information about the cost factors affecting the decisions on deposit rates and service 
fees at time t. Controlling for the bank brand effect and common time effects, the 
assumption is that interest rate and cost variables in precedent periods are correlated 
with interest rates at period t through the cost structure, but uncorrelated with the 
specific bank-month shock ξit.13 The use of the panel structure for identification follows 
the approach in Hausman and Zona (1994), Hausman (1996) and Nevo (2001), but I 
consider different temporal markets and the cited articles use variation across city 
markets.14 If σ ≠ 0, the share of deposits sit|g inside a nest appears as an additional 
                                                     
12 Spanish legislation allows depositors to cancel deposits –with a penalty on the interest rate paid– so it is 
possible to substitute existing deposits for new deposits and the stock of deposits in the financial market 
is a good measure of market size. 
13 The sixth month lag was chosen as a reasonable period to avoid contemporaneous correlation with 
unobserved supply factors and ensure that the bank cost structure is stable between current and lag dates. 
The estimation results are comparable if other lags are used, e. g, 3 months and 9 months.  
14 The articles mentioned above consider that the prices of a product brand in different cities are correlated 
through common costs at the brand level and that city specific demand components affecting prices are 
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endogenous variable in (13) and I add as instruments, following the approach in BLP 
(1995), the average across rivals of branches and employees per branch, which are 
exogenous to supply shock ξit but correlated with deposit rates and service fees through 
market competition. The use of the BLP-type instruments in the estimation of deposit 
supply is also considered in Dick (2008). The bank characteristics vary through time 
and I can then use these instruments in estimation together with the time-invariant bank 
fixed effects. On the contrary, brand characteristics in Nevo(2001) are time-invariant 
and they cannot be used as instruments if brand fixed effects are included as explanatory 
variables. 
  4. Estimation results 
 I present the results of the estimation of the supply function of household 
deposits in Table 2. Column (a) of Table 2 presents OLS estimates of a basic logit 
model (σ = 0) to serve as benchmark for the main specifications. The coefficients of the 
deposit rate, number of branches and employees per branch are positive and significant. 
On the contrary, the coefficient on service fees is not significant. The average deposit 
rate elasticity implied by these estimates is 0.63. The OLS coefficients are subject to the 
endogeneity bias described above and I derive 2SLS estimates of the basic logit model, 
with deposit rate and service fees as endogenous variables, to avoid this bias. The 
results of this specification are presented in column (b) of Table 2. The coefficients on 
both the deposit rate and the service fees increase in size, and the latter variable turns 
significant. The average deposit rate elasticity increases to 0.94 as result of controlling 
for endogeneity of the deposit rate and service fees. The column (c) presents the 2SLS 
estimates of the full nested logit model (σ ≠ 0) in equations (12) and (13), with separate 
nests for commercial and savings banks. The estimate 0.23 of the correlation parameter 
                                                                                                                                                           
not correlated across cities. The use of lagged variables as instruments can also be justified with the 
assumption that deposit rates and services fees are predetermined. 
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σ is significant and it rejects the hypothesis that the basic logit model is a valid 
description of the supply of deposits. The average deposit rate elasticities in the 
specifications of columns (b) and (c) are comparable, but the basic logit model 
underestimates the cross rate elasticity inside a nest. The basic logit implies a cross 
elasticity of -0.0008 whereas the nested logit model implies a cross elasticity of -0.007. 
A commercial or savings bank that offers higher deposit rates attracts more deposit 
funds from other institutions inside the same nest. Column (d) estimates again the 2SLS 
nested logit model, but it uses as definition of market share sit the ratio of new deposits 
to total household assets, which implies the assumption that households can convert any 
of their assets (corporate shares, public debt, etc.) into bank deposits. The results are 
robust to this different normalization of the market size.15 The standard errors in all the 
specifications are robust to heterocedasticity problems. 
 The average estimated elasticity of deposit supply to the deposit rate is in the 
range [0.63, 0.94]. This elasticity is relatively low, but it lies in the range of values 
previously found in the literature.16 Given that the price is an interest rate, we must take 
into account that high relative changes in this price, e. g., a doubling of deposit rates 
from 1.5% to 3% implying a 100% change, are possible and a greater elasticity would 
predict extreme variations in the volume of deposits as response to changes in deposit 
rates. The elasticity with respect to the number of branches, for a bank with an average 
number of branches equal to 550 is 0.242, which is below the figures found by Carbó et 
al. (2005), 0.782, and Martín-Oliver (2010), 0.318. Given that I study a period posterior 
                                                     
15 The substitution of the stock of deposits with total household assets increases the potential market size. 
I have also checked the robustness of the results to the reduction of market size to a fraction of the total 
stock of deposits and obtained satisfactory results. 
16 For the case of Spain in the period 1993-2002, Carbó et al. (2005) find an elasticity of 0.46 whereas 
Martín-Oliver et al. (2008) estimate an elasticity of 2.27 in the period 1988-2003. Fort the case of the 
U.S., there is also variation in the range of elasticities estimated in different articles. For example, Adams 
et al. (2007) find an average elasticity of 3.47 whereas the specification in Dick (2008) yields an estimate 
of 1.77 and Ho and Ishii (2011) find an elasticity of 1.19. 
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to the years in the cited articles, the results point to a decreasing importance of the 
branch network in the determination of the supply of deposits. 
 The estimated parameters are used to evaluate (10) and recover Rit. The cross 
sectional average of individual implicit returns on deposit funds in each period, Rt, is 
then compared with candidate reference rates in Figure 3. This average implied return Rt  
oscillates between 4.8% and 7.8% in the sample, with a clear increase in 2008. Figure 3 
reveals how the level of the interest rates on public debt with maturities of 5 and 10 
years is closer to the implicit return on deposit funds than the level of the Euribor 12 
months, but that the evolution of the interest rates on public debt and the implicit return 
are not clearly connected. On the contrary, the Euribor 12 months follows an evolution 
parallel to the implicit return over 2008 and the complete sample. These results point 
that it is not profitable to obtain funding through bank deposits to take a long position in 
the interbank market, but that the Euribor 12 months provides information about the 
expected implicit return on funds obtained through bank deposits.  
 The absolute level of the implicit return can not be justified only by the 
possibility of investing in Spanish government debt because the interest rates on this 
class of assets are not as high as the implicit return. In order to rationalize the estimated 
implicit returns, it is necessary to consider the returns on other assets such as existing 
and prospective loans to non financial firms and households and the private benefits for 
management. For the period considered, the expected implicit returns on deposit funds 
can also include the discounted return from the future participation in public support 
programs provided that current financing needs are covered with bank deposits.   
 The Table 3 presents the results for the OLS projections of the implicit return Rit 
on the reference interest rates according to the specification in equation (9). The 
standard errors in all the specifications are robust to heterocedasticity problems. The 
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specification in column (a) of Table 3 shows that all reference rates except the Spanish 
Public Debt with a five year term are correlated with the deposit rate, as the coefficients 
on these variables are both individually and jointly significant. The rejection of the 
hypothesis of a zero coefficient on the Euribor 12 months is the strongest according to 
individual t-tests. To control for the effect of common latent factors, I include fixed 
effects for the trimester in the specification in column (b) of Table 3, and I observe how 
the returns on the Spanish public debt with one and ten year terms lose their explanatory 
power. In order to accommodate a possible structural change as result of the financial 
crisis initiated in 2008, the specification in column (c) of Table 3 includes interactions 
of all the variables with an indicator for dates contemporaneous and posterior to 2008. 
The correlation between the deposit rate and the returns on Spanish public debt with a 
five year term turns significant when I control for the possibility of structural change. 
Furthermore, this relation is not stable through the sample, but it switches from negative 
to positive after 2007. This result would be consistent with the adoption of long 
positions in Spanish public debt during the latter part of the sample, as suggested by the 
descriptive analysis in Section 2. The model also finds a change in the relation between 
the Euribor 12 months and the deposit rate after 2007. The net effect of the Euribor 12 
months remains positive through the sample, but it is weaker during the period of 
financial crisis with a coefficient of 0.76 before 2008 and 0.76-0.32 = 0.44 after this 
date. 
  5. Counterfactual analysis 
 This section examines the sensitivity of deposit rates and bank profits to 
variations in the reference interest rates and the intensity of competition. I use the 
deposit supply model in column (c) of Table 2 and the projection of the implicit return 
of deposit funds on reference interest rates in column (c) of Table 3 in the computations 
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of the different counterfactual experiments. All the computations are performed for the 
financial crisis period of 2008-2010. 
 5.1 Transmission of the interbank rate  
 The results in Table 3 reveal that the increase of the Euribor 12 months leads to a 
higher return Rit on deposit funds, increasing the profits of bank i for a given volume of 
new deposits. However, competition in the deposit market also increases the deposit 
rate rit offered to households as response to a higher return Rit. In order to quantify the 
transmission to deposit rates and profits of the changes in the Euribor 12 months, I 
consider a counterfactual implicit return Rit(c) given by the expression: 
(17)     Rit(c) = Rit +0.44·ΔRt,Euribor 
where Rit is the implicit return estimated from equation (10), 0.44 is the impact of the 
Euribor 12 months on Rit from specification (c) of Table 3, and ΔRt,Euribor is the 
difference of the Euribor 12 months on month t and the average value of 2.6% for this 
interbank rate in the period 2008-2010. I obtain then for each month t a set of 
counterfactual returns {Rit(c)}i=1,…,I(t) with I(t) equal to the number of active banks. This 
shift to the average of the period leads to a decrease of the Euribor 12 months before 
February 2009, implying that Rit(c) < Rit, and an increment of the interbank rate, 
implying that Rit(c) > Rit, after that date.  
 Given the set of counterfactual returns{Rit(c)}i=1,…,I(t), I solve for every month t 
for the Nash equilibrium in deposit rates from the system of first order conditions that 
result from maximization of individual bank profits. The computation of the Nash 
equilibrium uses the estimates of the nested logit specification (c) in Table 2 and I 
recognize the variance that the estimated parameters introduce in the counterfactual 
computations with the use of parametric bootstrap. I take 500 draws {βb}b=1,…,500 of the 
distribution of estimated deposit supply parameters β and compute the counterfactual 
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deposit equilibrium and the change in profits for the period 2008-2010 for each draw βb. 
Confidence intervals on the changes of deposit rates and profits are then constructed 
from the bootstrap sample. The procedure is further detailed in the appendix. 
 I report in Table 4 the average variation in deposit rates and the cumulative 
change in profits at the end of each semester of the period 2008-2010. The reduction of 
the return on deposit funds Rit(c) brings down bank profits by 1,061 and 1,312 million 
euros in the first and second semesters of 2008 for the median profit change across 
bootstrap samples. Bank profits decrease despite the fact that the lower return on 
deposit funds Rit(c) implies equilibrium deposit rates that are on average 90bp lower 
than observed rates in year 2008. In years 2009 and 2010, the increase of Rit(c) with 
respect to Rit leads to an average increase in profits of 1,300 million euros every 
semester and an average increase of deposit rates of 50bp. Figure 4 plots the monthly 
counterfactual variation in bank profits and shows how the magnitude of the profit 
adjustment is a function of the counterfactual change in the Euribor 12 months. The 
Euribor 12 months series is above its period average during 2008 and below this 
average for years 2009 and 2010, and the plot reveals negative profit changes in 2008 
and increasingly positive adjustments for 2009 and 2010.  
  
 5. 2 Investment in long term Spanish government debt 
 I use the method in subsection 5.1 with the asset rate Rit(c) set equal to the 
interest rate on the 10 year Spanish government bond. The average interest rate on the 
10 year government bond is 4.2% in the period 2008-2010, whereas the average 
estimate of the implicit return on deposit funds is 6%. The limitation of investment 
opportunities of banks to long term Spanish government debt brings down the level of 
the implied return on deposits Rit(c) and this is translated into lower deposit rates and 
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bank profits. The results on Table 4 and Figure 5 reveal a large profit adjustment in 
2008, with a decrease in profits of 3,616 million euros in the first semester and 4,120 
million euros in the second semester of this year. The depositors also would be 
negatively affected with an average decrease of deposit rates of 300bp in 2008. The 
adjustment to profits and deposit rates remains negative in 2009 and 2010, but the 
magnitudes are lower than in 2008. 
 The results of this counterfactual exercise are explained by the fact that the 
estimated implicit return achieves its highest levels in year 2008, as shown in Figure 3, 
and it decreases after December 2008, approaching levels closer to the interest rate on 
long term government debt. As the estimated implicit return reflects the expectations of 
bank managers, the counterfactual change in profits in this experiment can also be 
interpreted as the additional profits that bank managers expected to earn above the 
profits resulting from investment in Spanish long term government debt. 
 5. 3 Collusion 
 I compute for every month t the deposit rates {rit,M} i=1,…,I(t) set by a perfectly 
collusive cartel with the return on deposit funds Rit(c) used in the counterfactual 
experiment equal to the estimated implicit rate Rit. This experiment measures the 
sensitivity of deposit rates and bank profits during the crisis period to the intensity of 
competition while keeping the reference interest rates equal to their observed values. 
Table 4 and Figure 6 reveal that the changes to deposit rates, an average reduction of 
115bp through the sample, and bank profits, an average increase of 105 million per 
month, are stable in the period 2008-2010. The counterfactual change in profits is not 
negligible, e.g., an additional profit of 1,407 million euros would have been earned in 
2008 by a cartel formed with the sample entities, but the computed variations are 
inferior with respect to the interest rate experiment. This indicates that the improvement 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1319
of investment opportunities has a potential greater impact on profitability of deposit 
funds than the relaxation of competitive conditions. 
6. Conclusion 
 This article estimates a discrete choice model of household deposit supply that 
controls for the endogeneity of deposit rates and allows for different substitution 
patterns across types of institutions. I find that depositors of commercial and savings 
banks are more likely to substitute their deposits within banks of the same type and that 
deposit rate elasticity is moderate but significant. 
 The estimates of the deposit supply model are used in a structural price 
competition model to recover the return on deposit funds implicit in the bank decisions 
on the volume and remuneration of new deposits from households. The implicit return 
is clearly correlated with the interbank rate through the sample period, indicating that 
either banks participate actively in the interbank market or, more plausibly, that the 
interbank rate is an important reference for bank investments, e. g., mortgage and 
corporate loans, even if banks have a limited participation in the interbank market. The 
interbank rate maintains a clear empirical connection with deposit rates and the implicit 
return on deposit funds despite the concern about the higher weight of public debt in the 
investment portfolio of Spanish banks. The relation of deposit returns and interest rates 
on long term debt through the whole sample period is weaker than the relation with the 
interbank rate, but I find some evidence of a stronger link between public debt and 
returns on deposit funds after the start of the financial crisis of 2008. 
 Counterfactual analysis reveals a sizeable variation of deposit rates and bank 
profits as response to changes in the interbank rate. I also find that the limitation of bank 
investment opportunities to long term Spanish government debt would yield a level of 
bank profits lower than the implicit bank profits recovered in the estimation exercise. 
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However, the negative profit difference associated to exclusive investment in public 
debt is lower in the later years 2009 and 2010. The moderation of competition is found 
to have a lower impact on bank profits than modification of reference rates in the 
interbank and public debt markets, but it would still be possible to increase bank profits 
significantly through collusion in the deposit market.  
 Appendix: Computations in the counterfactual exercises  
 The Nash equilibrium deposit rate rit,NE of bank i solves the following profit 
maximization problem: 
(18)     max rit (Rit(c)- rit)·D(rit, r-it,NE,.) 
where Rit(c) is the counterfactual return on deposit funds, D(.) is the nested logit deposit 
supply function in (12) evaluated with the parameters in specification (c) in Table 2 and 
the equilibrium deposit rates of all other banks r-it,NE are fixed parameters in the 
individual profit maximization problem of bank i. For each month t, I solve for the Nash 
equilibrium deposit rates {rit,NE}i=1,…,I(t) from the system of first order conditions 
resulting from the problem in (18) for each bank i, where I(t) is the number of active 
banks on month t. A generic equation of this system takes the following form: 
(19)   (Rit(c)-rit,NE)·∂D(rit,NE, r-it,NE,.)/∂rit  - D(rit,NE, r-it,NE,.) = 0 
 The deposit rates {rit,M}i=1,…,I(t) chosen by a perfectly collusive cartel solve the 
profit maximization problem of the multi-brand monopoly: 
(20)    max{r1t,…,rit,…, rI(t)t } Σi=1,…,I(t) (Rit(c)- rit)·D(rit, r-it,.) 
where all the relevant terms are defined as above. The solution of (20) with a direct 
search algorithm is possible, but it is more computationally efficient to work directly 
with the system of first order conditions of the problem in (20), with the first order 
condition for rit,M adopting the following generic form:    
(21)     (Rit(c)-rit,M)·∂D(rit,M,r-it,M,.)/∂rit - D(rit,M,r-it,M,.) 
       +Σs≠i(Rst(c)-rst,M)·∂D(rst,M,r-st,M,.)/∂rit=0 
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 The parametric bootstrap scheme used in the counterfactual exercises takes 
random draws βb of the form: 
(22)      βb = β + Γβ·ω 
where β and Γβ are respectively the estimated coefficients and the lower Cholesky 
decomposition of the variance covariance matrix Σβ for the nested logit specification (c) 
in Table 2. The term ω is a vector of draws of independent standard normal variables 
with size equal to the number of estimated coefficients in β. Train (2009) provides 
further details on random sampling schemes. 
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Note. For each class of deposits, the figure plots for each month the average interest rate at which new 
deposits are accepted by commercial and savings banks. NFFs stands for Non Financial Firms. Source: 
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FIGURE 2- Standard Deviation of Deposit Margins 
 
      Deposits, Households (Term up to 1 Year)          Deposits, Households (Term above 1 Year)        












Note. The relative margin of bank deposits and the asset A, e. g., an interbank loan or a one year Treasury 
Bill, can be calculated as (rA-rDEP/rA), where rA and rDEP correspond respectively with the interest rates on 
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EURIBOR 12 MONTHS TREASURY BILLS 1 YEAR BONDS 5 YEARS
BONDS 10 YEARS IMPLICIT ASSET RETURNS
Note. The implicit expected rate of return Rit is calculated with the formula in (10) with the assumption of 
nested logit deposit supply and using the estimated coefficients of column (c) of Table 2. The figure plots 
the cross sectional average Rt of individual bank returns Rit at each month. Source: Bank of Spain and 
own elaboration.  
 
 







































∆πit CONFIDENCE INTERVAL (95%)
Note. The plot shows for each month the difference Δπit of counterfactual and actual implicit profits on 
deposit funds for a counterfactual level of profits derived from the Nash-pricing equilibrium in deposit 
rates with the expected return of deposits adjusted by a shift of the Euribor 12 months to its average 
during the period 2008-2010. The central series and the confidence intervals for Δπit are the 5th, 50th and 
95th percentiles across bootstrap samples. Source: Bank of Spain and own elaboration. 
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∆πit CONFIDENCE INTERVAL (95%)
 
Note. The plot shows for each month the difference Δπit of counterfactual and actual implicit profits on 
deposit funds for a counterfactual level of profits derived from the Nash-pricing equilibrium in deposit 
rates with the expected return of deposits equal to the interest rate on the 10 year Spanish government 
bond. The central series and the confidence intervals for Δπit are the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles across 
bootstrap samples. Source: Bank of Spain and own elaboration. 
 











































∆πit CONFIDENCE INTERVAL (95%)
 
Note. The plot shows for each month the difference Δπit of counterfactual and actual implicit profits on 
deposit funds for a counterfactual level of profits calculated from the solution to the deposit rate setting 
problem for the perfectly collusive cartel. The central series and the confidence intervals for Δπit are the 
5th, 50th and 95th percentiles across bootstrap samples. Source: Bank of Spain and own elaboration. 
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Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Deposit Rate 2.75 1.12 0.38 9.94
Euribor 12 months 2.88 1.22 1.22 5.39
Treasury Bill 1 year 2.57 1.05 0.74 4.55
Bond 5 years 3.44 0.52 2.59 4.71
Bond 10 years 4.02 0.38 3.09 5.14
s it 0.08 0.14 0.00 2.37
(over system stock of deposits)
s it 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.82
(over total household assets)
s it 1.49 2.35 0.00 26.07
(over new bank deposits)
Branches 547 827 1 5567
Employees per branch 11 26 4 252
Service Fees 0.22 0.42 0.00 9.72
Labor Costs per Employee 36.06 17.72 6.14 149.92
 
Note. Deposit rates, service fees, interest rate variables (Euribor 12 months, Treasury bill with 1 year 
maturity, Spanish government bonds with 5 and 10 year maturities) and shares sit of new deposits from 
households over various measures of market size are reported in percentage. Branches are reported in 
thousands. Source: Bank of Spain. 
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Branches 0.5416 *** 0.4416 *** 0.3460 *** 0.3456 ***
0.0819 0.0844 0.0724 0.0727
Deposit Rate 0.2273 *** 0.3426 *** 0.2606 *** 0.2640 ***
0.0191 0.0470 0.0396 0.0396
Employees per branch 0.0025 * 0.0040 ** 0.0029 ** 0.0030 **
0.0014 0.0018 0.0014 0.0014
Service Fees -0.1142 -0.3132 * -0.2444 * -0.2449 *
0.0964 0.1751 0.1373 0.1378
σ 0.2345 *** 0.2331 ***
0.0632 0.0631
Constant -8.3004 *** -8.5824 *** -7.5321 *** -8.5006 ***
0.0906 0.1633 0.2904 0.2903
Own Interest Rate Elasticity 0.6255 0.9426 0.9302 0.9410
0.2535 0.3820 0.3767 0.3811
Cross Elasticty (Inside a Nest) -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0072 -0.0069
0.0011 0.0017 0.0123 0.0116
Cross Elasticity (Outside a Nest) -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0002
0.0011 0.0017 0.0013 0.0005
Individual Fixed Effect Significant Significant Significant Significant
Trimester Fixed Effect Significant Significant Significant Significant
R2 0.88 0.87 0.92 0.93
Number of observations 6384 5938 5938 5938
Note. The dependent variable in all specifications is ln(sit) – ln(s0), where sit is the share of new deposits 
of entity i over the total stock of deposits as defined in Section 3. The column (a) contains OLS estimates 
of the basic logit model, the column (b) provides 2SLS estimates of the basic logit model with Deposit 
Rate and Service Fees as endogenous variables, the column (c) provides 2SLS estimates of the nested 
logit model with Deposit Rate, Service Fees and the market share in a nest as endogenous variables, 
column (d) uses the same specification as column (c) with sit defined as the share of new deposits of 
entity n over total household assets. 
 
For each variable, the coefficient is reported in the upper position and standard error in the lower position. 
Own and cross elasticities are calculated with the formulas in (14), (15) and (16). The sample mean and 
standard deviation for each type of elasticity are reported respectively in upper and lower positions. 
The significant coefficients at 1% (5%, 10%) are marked with notation *** (**,*). 
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Euribor 12 Months 1.0160 *** 0.4575 *** 0.7630 ***
0.0210 0.0587 0.1360
Treasury Bill 1 Year -0.5593 *** 0.0864 0.0468
0.0307 0.0788 0.1344
Bond 5 years 0.0531 0.0520 -0.4465 **
0.0672 0.1248 0.2173
Bond 10 years 0.5026 *** -0.1896 0.1383
0.0484 0.1349 0.2097
Euribor 12 Months*I(Period posterior to 2008) -0.3283 **
0.1508
Treasury Bills 1 Year*I(Period posterior to 2008) -0.0801
0.1898
Bonds 5 years*I(Period posterior to 2008) 0.6988 ***
0.2661
Bonds 10 year*I(Period posterior to 2008) -0.3206
0.2872
Constant 1.8568 *** 4.5619 *** 4.1426 ***
0.0903 0.2584 0.3802
Individual Fixed Effect Significant Significant Significant
Trimester Fixed Effect Not Included Significant Significant
R2 0.7278 0.8146 0.815
Number of Observations 6384 6384 6384
 
Note. The specification (a) does allow neither a change in coefficients for the periods contemporaneous 
or posterior to year 2008 nor the trimester fixed effects. The specification (b) adds the trimester fixed 
effects and the specification (c) adds both the trimester fixed effects and the possible change in 
coefficients for the periods contemporaneous or posterior to year 2008 in order to test the stability of the 
relation between candidate reference rates and the implicit expected return on deposits. 
 
For each variable, the coefficient is reported in the upper position and standard error in the lower position. 
The significant coefficients at 1% (5%, 10%) are marked with notation *** (**,*). 
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Note. The Experiment 1 sets the Euribor 12 months equal to its average in the period 2008-2010 and 
adjusts the implicit return on deposits with the formula (17) in Section 5. The Experiment 2 assumes that 
the 10 year Spanish government bond is the only investment opportunity for the sample banks and sets 
the implicit return equal to the interest rate on this bond. The Experiment 3 calculates the deposit rates 
and profitability of a perfectly collusive cartel with the actual estimated implicit return. 
 
For each end of semester in the period 2008-2010, I report the average difference of counterfactual 
deposit rates and observed rates (Δrit) and the sum of the difference of counterfactual and observed 
implicit profits on deposit funds (Δπit). I compute these variations for 500 bootstrap samples of supply 
parameters β and I report the results for 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles (p5, p50, p95) across the bootstrap 
samples. 
∆r it ∆π it ∆r it ∆π it ∆r it ∆π it
June 2008 p5 -1.91 -1556 -4.03 -4340 -2.63 455
p50 -0.91 -1061 -3.03 -3616 -1.19 786
p95 -0.31 -54 -2.43 -2360 -0.35 1710
December 2008 p5 -1.95 -1850 -4.24 -4879 -2.63 313
p50 -0.95 -1312 -3.24 -4120 -1.19 621
p95 -0.35 -267 -2.64 -2860 -0.34 1570
June 2009 p5 -0.69 829 -2.66 -2660 -2.59 554
p50 0.31 1051 -1.65 -2147 -1.16 720
p95 0.92 1456 -1.05 -1194 -0.32 1342
December 2009 p5 -0.40 1274 -2.32 -2145 -2.59 398
p50 0.60 1544 -1.32 -1617 -1.15 628
p95 1.21 1975 -0.71 -652 -0.30 1419
June 2010 p5 -0.38 1102 -2.11 -1497 -2.57 275
p50 0.62 1354 -1.11 -1056 -1.12 512
p95 1.23 1765 -0.51 -227 -0.27 1228
December 2010 p5 -0.48 936 -2.09 -1429 -2.57 345
p50 0.52 1124 -1.08 -1048 -1.12 494
p95 1.13 1447 -0.48 -328 -0.27 1051
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
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